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Submission to the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan: The Honourable John Manley, Derek Burney, the Honourable Jake Epp, the Honourable Paul Tellier, Pamela Wallin.

November 28, 2007.

Dear Panel Members:

The Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee is a recently-formed association Canadians from all walks of life who are united in a commitment to the principle that as Canadians,we must honour our obligations to the cause of solidarity with the people of Afghanistan. This submission is our first public statement.

 Among those who have agreed to lend their names to this initiative (see appended) are people of the Left, and people from across the political spectrum, including a former lieutenant-governor and two former Progressive Conservative cabinet ministers. We are New Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, and people of no particular political affiliation. We are Muslims, Jews, Christians, and atheists. We are authors, journalists, academics, gay rights activists, student activists, Afghan-Canadians, and feminists.   

The Committee's position on Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, in sum, is this: We must stay. Human rights are universal. The United Nations calls for and expects Canada to remain dedicated to Afghanistan's reconstruction and to the battle against terrorism there. We recognize that a robust military engagement, with the UN's sanction and the consent of the Government of Afghanistan, is vital and necessary.

 By the words "we must stay," we must clearly and explicitly oppose Option 4 among the four options the Independent Panel has been charged with considering, namely: "Withdraw all Canadian military forces from Afghanistan after February 2009 except those required to provide personal security for any remaining civilian employees."

 Option 4 is an indefensible option from the perspective of Canada's commitment to the universality of human rights and our country's proud dedication to multilateralism. We recognize the conflict in Afghanistan as a liberation struggle, waged by the Afghan people and their allies, against oppression, against obscurantism, illiteracy, and the most brutal forms of misogyny. It is a fight for democracy, and for peace, order, and good government. It is also a struggle waged by the sovereign Government of Afghanistan, a member state of the United Nations, against illegal armed groups that seek to overturn the democratic will of the Afghan people.

 In Afghanistan, the great global struggle for the recognition and protection of basic human rights – universal rights - is being waged with a particular and necessary ferocity. We cannot and must not retreat from that struggle.

 The objective of extending and securing the sovereignty of the Government of Afghanistan to all corners of that great country cannot be achieved without a robust international military presence. Canada is one the richest countries on earth, and as such we have absolutely no excuse to shirk from our duty to make a proper and effective contribution to that military engagement.

 For the Government of Canada to adopt Option 4 as a convenient policy response to what we concede is a great deal of confusion, partisanship, anxiety and incoherence in the current "public debate" about Afghanistan in Canada, would be a catastrophic abdication of leadership.

 Option 4 represents a rebuke to the United Nations, which consistently calls upon those of its member states with soldiers in Afghanistan to maintain and indeed increase their contributions to the necessary military response to such "insurgent" groups as the Taliban that operate there.

 Further, Option 4 would reduce Canada – a country with one of the best-equipped and most-experienced armed forces in NATO - to a weak, junior partner in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces would be reduced to the level of a group of security guards.

 The members of the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee harbour a range of reservations and misgivings over the proposed course of action set out in Option 3, namely: "Shift the focus of Canadian military and civilian security, development and governance efforts to another region of Afghanistan."   

We recognize that Canada, by its engagement in Kandahar – an area where acute conditions of  lawlessness and "insurgency" prevail - has suffered greatly, and arguably disproportionately, in the terrible death and injury of our soldiers there. We also recognize that there is no shame in wanting another a NATO partner to relieve us of our particular burden in Kandahar.

However, to simply abandon Canada's multi-faceted efforts in Kandahar Province for "another region" would be a perilous and precipitous decision. Also, Option 3's underlying but unspoken assumption - that leaving Kandahar would leave Canadian soldiers more safe from harm – is very likely to be a false assumption. Option 3 also appears to be based at least partly upon the untested notion that there is another NATO partner ready to assume the lead role in Kandahar, and that a new NATO partner could simply pick up in Kandahar, successfully and effectively, where Canada left off.

 Anti-democratic and illegal armed groups in Afghanistan are not now confined to Kandahar, and there is no reason to assume that the forces now operating in Kandahar would simply remain in that Province and leave the rest of country free from harm should Canada merely "shift" its efforts elsewhere. Just as likely, Kandahar itself could become the kind of "safe haven" currently associated with certain border regions in Pakistan.

 In considering Option 3, we strongly urge panel members to bear in mind the risk of squandering Canada's efforts that option threatens (and as should be obvious, this point also pertains to Option 4), not least is the blood Canadians have shed in Kandahar.  It would also be unrealistic to imagine that the priceless and irreplaceable expertise and experience Canadians have developed in Kandahar Province will necessarily accrue to a NATO successor in the turmoil of the vacuum we would leave behind there.

Because we acknowledge that a robust Canadian military engagement is vital and necessary, and is expected of our country by both the United Nations and the Government of Afghanistan, we see little merit in Option 2: "Focus on development and governance in Kandahar, with sufficient military to provide effective protection for our civilians engaged in development and governance efforts. This would require another country (or countries) to provide a military force sufficient to ensure the necessary security in which such efforts can take place in Kandahar province."

While this option at least anticipates a continuance of Canada's development-and-governance efforts in Kandahar, built upon Canada's leadership in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Option 2 nonetheless may result in a combination of the untenable aspects of Option 4 with the unrealistic expectations of Option 3.

Similarly, we discern what we fear is a fatal flaw in Option 1: "Train, support and develop the Afghan army and police towards a self-sustaining capacity in Kandahar Province, with a phased withdrawal of Canadian troops starting in February 2009 consistent with progress towards this objective."

Nevertheless, the mandate of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan allows the Panel to consider each of the aforementioned options "without intending to exclude others."Consequently,  we urge you to consider Option 1 as a starting point, amended appropriately, and as the basis for the Panel's recommendations to government.

We wholeheartedly support the proposition that Canada and its NATO partners should rededicate and enhance efforts to "train, support and develop" the Afghan Army and the Afghan National Police, in Kandahar Province, and elsewhere in Afghanistan. But there are fundamental problems with a commitment to a "phased withdrawal" by 2009, and the terminology "consistent with progress" is too vague to be of use.

The problems with Option 1 that we would like panel members to acknowledge and address by amendment are twofold.    

The first is that, as written, Option 1 is based largely on wishful thinking, and to a lesser extent, bureaucratic convenience. There is compelling evidence to suggest that neither the Afghan Army nor the Afghan National Police, individually or in combination, will be capable of standing on their own by 2009, sufficient to match the security and counter-insurgency capacity Canada is providing in Kandahar Province – a capacity which in itself is arguably insufficient to the challenge at hand.

 By all the evidence available to us, we see no cause for Canada to consider planning for a phased withdrawal of troops from Kandahar, as anticipated by Option 1, at any date before 2011.

 The Afghanistan Compact, to which Canada and roughly 50 other nations are signatories, sets "by end-2010" as the date for a variety of benchmarks for "a nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced" Afghan National Army, fully established, democratically accountable, organized and trained, adequately equipped, sufficient to maintain Afghanistan's national security, and meeting several more standards, including troop levels.

 "By end-2010" is the benchmark for a variety of other objectives set out in the Afghan Compact that include targets for the Afghan National Police, the Afghan Border Police, the disbandment of illegal armed groups, the elimination of the illegal opium trade, meeting Afghanistan's obligations under the Ottawa Convention on landmines, and so on.

 While Canada's specific commitment to leading the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) carries no direct obligation beyond 2009, we argue that it is the end of 2010, and certainly not before, that Canada should set as an appropriate time to review its overall military commitments in Afghanistan. Canada should make its troop commitment decisions contingent upon measurable progress as set out in the relevant provisions of the Afghanistan Compact., rather than merely "consistent with" progress.  

Specific Observations

 1. Negotiating with the "Taliban."

Much has been made of the prospects for negotiating with the Taliban as a new and imaginative approach to peace in Afghanistan. That prospect must be situated in its factual and historical context.

Firstly, although the Canadian Forces may negotiate the surrender of armed criminals our soldiers happen to engage, Canada is not entitled to trespass on the sovereignty of Afghanistan by negotiating with illegal armed groups in the absence of Afghan government direction.

Secondly, the Afghan government, with the assistance of Canada and other of its partners in a United Nations initiative, had already negotiated the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of roughly 56,000 former combatants well before the idea of negotiating with the Taliban came into vogue.

Thirdly, Afghan president Hamid Karzai has been clear from the outset of his term of office that he is prepared to negotiate with any armed group that is prepared to lay down its weapons. Indeed, President Karzai has engaged representatives of illegal armed groups directly in discussions.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, while there is scant evidence that the Taliban's hard-core jihadist leadership is interested in any such entreaties,  Canada can and should demand that the Government of Afghanistan should not under any circumstances contravene its international commitments by "negotiating out" the rights of women in any talks with the Taliban, or in the establishment of any power-sharing agreement.

2. A distinct Canadian approach.

Canada is a sovereign nation and must make every effort to determine its own distinct contribution to the United Nations' efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan and assist the Afghan government in extending the rule of law throughout the country. We must take particular care to confront the misapprehension that Canada's role in Afghanistan is simply the function of an alliance with the United States of America.

 It is not just that this is untrue. It is also a misapprehension that has severely inhibited the vigorous and necessary debate in Canada about what our policy options in Afghanistan can and should be. It is a misrepresentation of Canada's purposes and objectives in Afghanistan, and it has cast a cloud over Canada's role as an independent member of NATO and as a member of the UN's International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

 Further, Canada would be well advised to distance itself from the United States' Operation Enduring Freedom owing to the association of that operation with the unnecessary deaths of Afghan civilians. Canada would also benefit from a more transparent disassociation from the costly and counterproductive opium-eradication program as currently prosecuted under American leadership.

  We recognize that the suppression of the opium trade is an objective of the Afghanistan Compact and is strongly supported by the Government of Afghanistan. But Canada would be of greater assistance to the Afghan government, and perhaps especially to the impoverished farmers of Kandahar, if we expended more effort in the identification of more practical and effective solutions to the problem of illegal opium production, and alternatives to illegal opium production. We defer to the Senlis Council, the Agha Khan Foundation and other civil-society and aid organizations who are working on these solutions.

3. Development aid and reconstruction initiatives.

While these aspects of Canada's engagement are not specific to the mandate of the Independent Panel, development and diplomacy are nonetheless inextricably linked to the defence aspects of Canada's Afghan mission. It is clear that the Canadian Forces must play a direct role in development efforts in the volatile Kandahar Province.

 Canada should increase or at the very least maintain current levels of funding support for the Afghan Government, the United Nations in Afghanistan, and international non-government organizations. Canada should also demonstrate a heightened commitment to the direct engagement of Afghan people, and Afghan civil society institutions, in development and reconstruction initiatives.

The federal government must also make far greater efforts to ensure that Canadians are fully informed of the development and reconstruction work undertaken in their name in Afghanistan.

We should also point out that the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee does not confine itself to advocating on government policy alone. We look to the Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan (W4WA) as an example of the kind of concrete solidarity that Canadians as individuals, as students, as trade unionists, and as members of civil-society organizations can offer the people of Afghanistan.

The W4WA, a volunteer organization, has raised $2 million since 1996, which has employed hundreds of teachers in Afghanistan adn has provided for the purchase of books, the expenses of an orphanage, medical supplies, school guards, cooks, and so on.

General Observations

Those of us who formulated the idea of the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee did so with an understanding that a progressive, internationalist, and idealistic Canadian policy must also be realistic and cautious. We saw that there was no short-term solution to Afghanistan's problems.

While terms such as "exit strategy" and "Canada's traditional peacekeeping role" are commonplace in the lexicon of Canada's debates over the Afghanistan question, what is regrettably less evident is the recognition that exit strategies must be adaptive and contingent upon real-world events, and responsive to measurable progress.

Afghanistan's problems are both global and regional, and they must be understood in their geopolitical context. It is trite to say "there is no military solution" in Afghanistan - no one is arguing that there is. But "peacekeeping" is not an option. There are well-armed anti-government combatants, both foreign and domestic, actively waging war in Afghanistan. So, there are no truce lines to patrol, there is no ceasefire to monitor, and there is no "traditional" peacekeeping role to which Canada might return there. There is no peace to keep.

 It should also be remembered that Canada's peacekeeping commitments, like our commitment in Afghanistan, have been often bloody affairs that have cost the lives of many Canadians soldiers.  Canada's peacekeeping missions have also rarely been short-term engagements, with handily scheduled "exit strategies." Our role in Cyprus alone involved the commitment of a full battalion, from 1964 to 1993.

It is not just the absence of clarity that has confounded what should be a thoughtfully argued, historic national debate about Canada's role in Afghanistan. The debate has also been corroded by partisanship and political point-scoring, and the multilateral basis of  Canada's commitment in Afghanistan has been eclipsed by an unseemly preoccupation with the American interests and intentions in Afghanistan, both real and imaginary. Canada's Afghan engagement is a life-and death matter, a question of pressing national and international importance, and yet the debate has been infantilized by a wholly false context, with its own invented hierarchy of virtue,  from "anti-war" down to "pro-war."

 This has eclipsed the most important questions - questions about how Canada can most concretely, effectively and efficiently show support and solidarity with the people of Afghanistan – people who have undergone the most horrific suffering and hardship over the past few decades. It in is those questions, and in that context, that we urge the members of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan to see the task before them.

 The Independent Panel is in a unique position to plainly set out what is truly at stake in the options its members have been asked to consider. This panel has an opportunity to change the tone, tenor and substance of the Afghanistan debate in Canada. We urge the Independent Panel to situate the aspirations and interests of the Afghan people themselves directly at the centre of its deliberations.

A commitment to Afghanistan that is consistent with Canada's best traditions, Canada's international reputation, and Canada's values, will require of Canadians a much deeper understanding of and familiarity with and respect for the Afghan people. What's necessary to that purpose is a clear understanding of what it is that ordinary Afghans think, and what ordinary Afghans say, about our role there.

 The picture of Afghanistan that tends to emerge in the Canadian news media, inadvertently but nonetheless unfairly, unjustifiably and inaccurately, is of a nation that is inherently violent, irredeemably backward, and incorrigibly hostile to "the west." In fact, there is much that Canada shares with Afghanistan. Like Canada, Afghanistan is linguistically and ethnically diverse. Like Afghanistan, Canada not so long ago emerged from the shadow of empire. Canadians, too, only slowly gathered to themselves the fully sovereign jurisdiction over their own affairs, and it was only very recently that Canada devised a written constitutional basis for representative democracy and individual rights.

 Canadians now share something with Afghans that is of a much greater consequence than vital trade relations, or profound historical ties, or deeply-shared and long-standing cultural affiliations. Canadians have shed blood in Afghanistan, fighting for its dignity and its freedom. We share that with the Afghan people, and it is not something to treat lightly.

 Canadian politicians and opinion-makers, and the members of this panel, would be well served to follow the example of the Canadian Forces' civil-military cooperation units that routinely meet in shura with Afghan villagers. By that example, we mean a practice of close and careful attention to what the Afghan people themselves have to say about their needs and priorities, and a policy of being directly guided by those findings in the options we adopt.

 To be uninformed and uninterested in what Afghans say about Canada's presence in their country, and to rely solely on Canadian public opinion as a guide for specific policy options in Afghanistan, is to engage in a fatal narcissism.

Owing to the preponderance of recently-gathered and readily-available evidence, we no longer have any excuse to be uninformed about what the Afghan people themselves say about their own needs and priorities. The evidence is available in the form of a dozen separate focus group analyses, issue-specific surveys, and major national and regional public opinion polls, all undertaken in Afghanistan. The evidence comes also in the form of the Afghan people's democratic will as expressed by their own constitutionally elected government.

 The evidence is plain. The vast majority of the Afghan people, in their own voices, and through their own government, in its international commitments, say this: Stay. Human rights are universal. Canada should remain dedicated to Afghanistan's reconstruction, and to the battle against terrorism. A robust military engagement, with the UN''s sanction and the consent of the Government of Afghanistan, is vital and necessary.

While we do not purport to be "experts" in military strategy or foreign relations, we are citizens of a democracy, and as such we claim standing to address ourselves to these matters.

 What we can say without any hesitation is that Canada cannot and must not simply wash its hands of Afghanistan. We must stand with the embryonic Afghan democracy against its enemies, and we must do this simply because we can do this. The opportunity has presented itself, and came to us unbidden, in September, 2001. To refuse the opportunity would be to turn our backs on everything that Canadians have ever claimed to stand for and believe in.

 Although we are but one country among the 37 nations participating in the UN's International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Canada is major, leading contributor.

 Any careless lessening of our resolve could easily run the risk of plunging Afghanistan back into total civil war. We would also risk emboldening the enemies of democracy the world round, not least of whom are those who continue to prey upon the proud Afghan people - the armed enemies of women, of literacy, of free speech, and of peace.

We should stay.